本文以美國為例，探討地方議會專業化程度提高後，是否更有助於議員更上層樓，進軍國會？抑或更有益於議員留在地方議會內發展其政治生涯？透過實證分析美國各州州議員晉陞聯邦眾議院的資料，本文發現專業性的州議會既可協助州議員晉陞國會，也可以是州議員政治生涯的終站。以州議員晉陞聯邦眾議院為例，「專業性—晉陞可能」兩者之間並非如過去研究者所定義的線性關係。州議員晉陞聯邦眾議院的可能性可視為是州議會專業性程度的凸函數，即存在某個州議會專業性程度能夠極大化州議員晉陞聯邦眾議院的可能性。此外，州議會專業性的高低同時影響民主黨籍與共和黨籍州議員的前途選擇：就影響的程度而言，兩黨間或許存在些許差異，但影響的方式並沒有明顯的黨派之分。

This essay explores the extent to which legislative professionalism alters
state legislators’ career paths to Congress in the United States. Using crosssectional data for sixteen Congresses in the period from 1974 to 2004, I argue that the likelihood of advancement to the House of Representatives for state legislators is a quadratic function of legislative professionalism measured by legislative salary. Furthermore, there exists a critical level of legislative salary that maximizes this function. At this critical level, the marginal effect of legislative professionalism on the likelihood of advancement to the House for state legislators goes to zero. Additionally, the effect of state legislative
professionalism on the likelihood of advancement to the House for state
legislators does not differ significantly for Democrats and Republicans.