在新公共管理下「責信」概念重新被帶回到公共服務的管理當 中，責信動力以及達成責信的機制，成爲核心議題。公共服務引進契 約委託的輸送方式等於帶進一個更加複雜的行政結構、更爲鬆散的責 信機制，因此本文旨在探討社會服務契約委託下爲追求績效、品質與 消費者權益之現有及應有的責信動力與責信機制。首先在理論層面分 析管理主義脈絡下層級、法律、政治、專業等責信構面之意義、内 涵、在實務上的運作，以及遭遇的困難與對策；並以台灣本土的實證 資料呈現並評估目前在各責信面向所發展出來的機制及其實效。其 次，有鑑於社會服務的特殊性格、社會服務接受者的脆弱性，及其與 服務提供者間不對等的權力關係，本文將進一步從「行政法原則」角 度，探討在講究績效的管理主義責信下，對服務使用者權益之衝擊， 同時也分析在社會服務契約委託架構下，阻礙行政法原則實踐的因 素。第三，本文將以「當事人一代理人理論」爲軸心，剖析社會服務 契約委託制度之本質，及要求管理主義與行政法責信的内在困境與限 制。最後，將根據以上的分析與對話，在理論層面探討各責信構面之 間的關係；在實務運作層面則分別對中央與地方政府及民間受託的非 營利組織提出具體的建議。本文發現台灣目前社會服務契約委託在管 理主義與行政法原則的責信兩方面之表現均不盡如人意，其表相的困 境在於缺乏競爭市場，專業責信未盡成熟，公部門管理資源投入不 足，尚未發展出有意義的監督與評鑑制度以落實法律責信；更根本的 責信危機則是來自於對於契約委託制度的先天缺陷之不察與輕忽，因 而建議決策者與契約管理者應務實地體察並在責信機制的設計上有所 回應。本文並指出台灣由於法律與專業責信未臻成熟，因此各受託者 多著力於政治責信，藉以自我證明正當性並取得更優越的受託條件， 呈現政治責信掩蓋過法律責信與專業責信的奇特現象，此一現實使得政府更難成爲一個精明的購買者。就理論層面而言，此一發現豐富了 文獻有關責信概念的分析，顯示不同構面的責信彼此之間並非各自獨 立表現，而是存在相互替代與交換的關係，政府應致力於建立一個整 合的責信系統。最後，本文從政策面與執行面分別提出落實委外責信 的建議。

The concept of “accountability” as related to outsourcing of social services has attracted new attention in public administration. Contracting out social services by funding agencies gives rise to a more sophisticated administrative process and a less stringent mechanism in ensuring accountability. This paper analyzes, in the social services outsourcing process, the dynamics and mechanisms of accountability, that do and should exist in assuring performance, quality, and consumer safeguards. The first section explores theoretically four core dimensions of accountability, namely, hierarchical, legal, political, and professional. Secondly, this paper presents empirical data pertaining to the practice and problems as observed in Taiwan. The third section discusses how practice of accountability under the principles of managerialism impacts on the rights and interest of the service recipients. Also discussed are factors preventing enforcement of administrative laws. Several findings are presented: little competition exists in social service delivery industry; what accountability means to professional personnel is generally lacking; government’s investment in developing meaningful and effective mechanism to oversee and evaluate accountability is insufficient; decision makers and contract managers need to recognize and respond to the pitfalls and potential accountability crisis existed in the current outsourcing practice. Because legal and professional accountability are quite weak in Taiwan, service delivery contractors focus on political accountability to prove its worthiness and to obtain better treatment. The reality of legal accountability overridden by political accountability severely hampers government agencies9 ability to be effective purchasers of quality services. The recognition of current situation in Taiwan has heightened the interest in research and analysis of different dimensions of accountability, which do not exist independently, but interrelate with ech other. The author concludes this paper by presenting recommendations in policy development and implementations.