中共軍隊從朱毛紅軍算起，最初只有幾千人，但短短三、四年時間 便發展到數萬人之眾，這其間的因緣際會值得探討。初上井岡山時，毛 澤東、朱德、彭德懷、王佐等人各懷心思；紅軍也遲遲難以壯大，卻在 1929 年初被迫逃亡到贛南閩西後，迅速打開局面。但這一發展歷程實際 上並不在毛澤東的計畫之內，中共可以說是因禍得福。1930 年後，紅軍 規模急劇膨脹，除地緣因素外，也與中央的激進政策有關。李立三主政 時期，中共中央倡導向中心城市進攻，雖然毛澤東極力反對，但這一「歷 史的誤會」，竟然再次陰差陽錯的促使紅軍部隊獲得大發展。到第四、 第五次反「圍剿」時期，紅軍已經呈現盛極而衰的跡象，但戰爭還在繼 續，中共很難停止「擴紅」。那麼，中共在蘇區的徵兵規模到底如何？ 百姓又作何反應？這些問題都值得討論。

The Red Army of the Communist Party of China grew from initially only having several thousand people led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong into tens of thousands of people in just three or four years, the karma of which is worthy of discussion. When first coming to Jinggangshan area, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Wang Zuo, and so on, in fact, each created his own idea. It was difficult for the Red Army to grow in the Jinggangshan area and at the beginning of 1929, the Red Army were forced to go fugitive to the south of Jiangxi and the west of Fujian, but unexpectedly the situation quickly opened up. But, the course of development was not actually within Mao Zedong’s plans, so the Communist Party of China could be said to have this blessing in disguise. After 1930, the rapid expansion of the scale of the Red Army, in addition to geographical factors, was also related to the radical policy of the Central Committee of CPC. During Li Lisan’s period of administration, the Central Committee of CPC advocated attacking the central cities; but Mao Zedong strongly opposed it. This “historical misunderstanding” unexpectedly prompted the Red Army troops to have great development. By the time of the fourth and the fifth campaigns against “Encirclement and Suppression,” the Red Army had shown the signs of boom ─ and ─ bust, but the war still continued, so it was difficult for the Communist Party of China to stop the momentum of the expanding Red Army. So then, what on earth was the conscription scale of the Communist Party of China in the Soviet Area and how did people react, which all may be worth discussing.