在東亞因明傳統中，元曉以他針對玄奘唯識比量的相違決定量著稱於世。過去一直以為相違決定量傳到中國，遭到窺基的批判以後便不再有下文。但實際遠非如此。窺基不僅不是第一個批判相違決定量的學者，元曉後來更對來自當時中國的批判作出過回應。本文通過重新考察日韓學者新近研究發現的文軌《十四過類疏》中討論唯識比量和相違決定量的文字，試圖揭示有關文軌與元曉之間關係的一系列新事實，即：元曉的相違決定量的確為文軌所知，文軌在《十四過類疏》中對該量作出了批判。文軌的批判當早於窺基的批判。而且，善珠在《因明論疏明燈抄》中援引的一段《判比量論》文字更表明，文軌的批判的確為元曉所知，元曉對它也的確作出了回應。元曉回應的要點在於：相違決定量的「所立法」如果修改為「離極成眼識」而非原先單純的「離眼識」，便能避免文軌指出的「不共不定」過失。本文由此進而推測：文軌《因明入正理論疏》的前半部分（即三卷本的前兩卷）當撰寫於相違決定量到達長安之前，而後半部分（即三卷本的第三卷《十四過類疏》）當撰寫於相違決定量到達長安以後。至於相違決定量是否在玄奘去世以前便已到達長安，這仍是一個有待研究的問題。

In the history of the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic, Wǒnhyo 元曉 is famous for his antinomic inference directed against Xuanzang’s inference of consciousness-only. Recent studies by Shigeki Moro (2017), by Ippei Okamoto (2018) and by Sung-chul Kim (2017) have brought into light the close relation between Mungwe 文軌 and Wǒnhyo. They fi nd that Mungwe in the last part of his Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu 因明入正理論疏 has discussed an inference which is the same one as Wǒnhyo’s antinomic inference and that Wǒnhyo in a fragment of his P’an biryang non 判比量論 has cited Mungwe’s discussion. The present author, through reexamining the passages from Mungwe as found by Moro, Okamoto and Kim, tries to show some new facts concerning the relation between Mungwe and Wǒnhyo that: Wǒnhyo’s antinomic inference is known to Mungwe. The latter has offered a criticism of it. Zenju 善珠 in his Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因 明論疏明燈抄 cites a passage from P’an biryang non which shows that Mungwe’s criticism is known to Wǒnhyo and Wǒnhyo has made a reply to it. The point of Wǒnhyo’s reply is that his inference will be free from the fault as pointed out by Mungwe if the property to be proved of this inference is reformulated into the condition of being separate from the visual consciousness that is well established (離極成眼識). The fi rst part of Wǒnhyo’s discussion on the antinomic inference in P’an biryang non has been reconstructed by Sung-chul Kim (2017). The above mentioned fragment cited by Zenju could be regarded as the last part of Wǒnhyo’s discussion on this topic, while the middle part, which probably contains Wǒnhyo’s more citations from Mungwe’s criticism, is still missing. At last, the present author entertains a hypothesis that the former part of Mungwe’s Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu, which is actually the source of Wǒnhyo’s knowledge of the inference of consciousnessonly, is written before the arrival of the antinomic inference in China, while the last part of this work, which contains a criticism of the antinomic inference, is written after the arrival of this inference. However, whether or not the antinomic inference arrives in China before Xauzang’s death in 664, namely, whether or not Xuanzang knows Wǒnhyo’s inference, is still an open question.