本文以《攝真實論疏》第23 章〈考察外部對象品〉中寂護 與蓮華戒對妙護的駁斥作為文獻依據，探討寂護—蓮華戒的唯識 立場。為了批評妙護外部對象實在論的主張，寂護—蓮華戒討論 了包括識的自我證知就是識別性、青相與青知的共同了知限定、 第一性及第二性的認知無法緣取外部對象以及勝義無所緣等議 題。在這些論辯中，寂護—蓮華戒從未使用過有相唯識派的立 場，一律都以離二取、無二的自我認識，即無相唯識論作為基 調，但也不能就此簡單把他們的觀點等同於形象完全不存在的知 識論。他們所謂的「無二」就是識的自我證知，它如同明照性， 沒有所取—能取的分別，方便說為認知的識別性。其次，他們承 認青等形象與青之知是「共同了知」，二者一體不離；對青相的 知就是自我證知，不需要依賴認識緣取對象的認知模式，認識內 也沒有作為認知對象的部分（所取分）。像這樣，識是自證的， 對同體的青等形象的證知就是識自身，它不需要依賴能—所因果 關係，也不會緣取任何外在或內在的對象，所以究竟來說（勝義）無所緣。

In the current paper, I have discussed some arguments between Śāntarakṣita-Kamalaśīla and Śubhagupta in the Chapter 23 (Bahirarthaparīkṣā) of Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā in order to find out the main point of view of consciousness-only theory held by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. In these debates, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have never advocated the theory that a cognition arises with a form (sākārajñānavāda). However, this does not mean that they can be simply labeled as advocators of the cognition without any form (nirākārajñānavāda). In fact, they claim that the cognition is non-dual and it is self-cognizing without subjective and objective aspects. The cognition cognizes itself just like a light illuminates itself. It does not grasp any object outside itself. The illumination is the determinate nature (paricchedarūpa) of the cognition. According to this basic idea, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla criticize Śubhagupta’s realism. They argue that the blue form and the cognition of the blue form are definitely perceived together (sahopalambhaniyama). Theyare not separated from each other. The cognition of the blue form is not a cognition that realizes the object aspect, but a cognition that realizes itself. Thus, the cognition itself does not rely on any causality such as the relationship between the grasping and grasped aspects. It cognizes neither the external object nor the internal object. Ultimately, the cognition is without any object-support (nirālambana).