本研究檢視若公司內部重要人士違反證券交易法第一百五十五條規定時，公司之財務報告是否較不具時效性。該法條之立法精神在於防止證券市場參與者操縱證券價格，再透過市場交易賺取價差。本文論述這些違法者應該有能力操縱公司財務資訊，並影響資訊的揭露時間；因此這些公司可能延遲財務報告的公告，因為：(一)公司方面可能有意延遲公告，(二)會計師查核期間可能因風險較大，而需時較長，(三)公司與會計師之間協商的時間可能較長。 這個問題相當值得注意，因為過去的研究大多將焦點放在人為操縱影響資訊的可靠性，如『盈餘操縱』或『盈餘管理』影響資訊的可靠性的研究 ( 參見Friedlan ( 1992 )、Aharonyet al. ( 1993 )、DeFond and Jiambalvo ( 1994 )、陳雅琳(民82)、管夢欣(民82)與官心怡(民82))。本文首先提出證據說明人為操縱也影響了財務報告資訊的攸關性。 本文的另外一個重要貢獻是研究方法的改進：公司財務報告的時效性是以公告日期作為衡量之基礎，這些日期資料是抑平的資料(censored data)，因此本文以存活模型(duration model)修正過去類似文獻上所用OLS估計法的偏誤。結果顯示以OLS的估計法分析之下，八個自變數中只有二個顯著。而且，公司規模與現金流量兩變數符號與理論預期相反。相對地，以存活模型的最大概似法估計，其結果相當引人注目，八個自變數中有六個相當顯著：公司規模愈大，財務報表公告愈早；公司發生淨損時，會延遲公告時間；發生非常損益時，公告較遲。更換會計師之年度，較晚公告財務報表；營業現金流量減少時，公司較遲公告財務報表。雖然事務所規模與查核意見形態兩個變數之係數不顯著，但其符號與預期一致。最後，統計檢定也支持本文提出的假說：『公司董監事與重要經營幹部若牽涉證交法第一百五十五條，其財報期間比其他公司更長』

The main purpose of the Section 155 of the Security Exchange Act (SEA) was set to curb price manipulation. This paper examines SEC filing lags of firms with insiders violating the Section 155 of SEA. All the cases involving violation of Section 155 are of the following two types: (1) collective action by most board of directors and top managers, and (2) violation by the most influential character of the firm. Consequently, I hypothesize that those people, who have been penalized by courts for violation of Section 155, have incentive and ability to manage earnings and to delay public announcement of annual reports. This implies that those firms would have longer SEC filing lags. Since the data of the filing lags are right censored, the OLS estimates used in the past research are biased. I apply duration model to correct for this bias. The empirical evidence shows that the filings would be longer for (1) small firms, (2) firms with bad news, (3) firms report extraordinary items, (4) firms switch auditors. Also, the findings support my hypothesis that those firms involved in violation of Section 155 have longer filing lags.