由於目前有關SARS的中共政治研究，欠缺專研中央與地方關係者，本文企圖填補此一空白。本文以理性抉擇制度論為研究途徑，分析抗SARS過程中央與廣東之策略互動。本文發現：中央與廣東共經歷兩回合的策略互動。中央的政策先是「隱瞞疫情」，後為「公開疫情」。廣東的對策則是先為先鋒，後採抗拒，顯示廣東有能力以利弊為考量，自由選擇對應中央政策之對策。兩回合的結果，第一次為「積極合作」，符合中央與廣東之最佳偏好。第二次為「部分妥協」，廣東偏好程度高於中央。此發現與非零和博奕之觀點不謀而合，但更深入指出雙方妥協之結果是較符合廣東之偏好。此一發展，是否將成為中國政治之常態，形成所謂「權力平衡」模式，將有待更多案例之證明。

This paper examines the relationship between the central and local governments in China on the basis of their interactions during the SARS crisis. This is accomplished by applying the rational choice institutionalism approach to the analysis of the strategic interactions that occurred between the central and Guangdong governments while they dealt with the SARS crisis. In the course of the research for this paper, it was discovered that the central and Guangdong governments had held two rounds of strategic interaction. The central government had initially “covered up the epidemic” and later “announced the epidemic.” Guangdong had initially cooperated with the central government; however, it later attempted to resist the central government‟s measures. As a result, Guangdong was capable of evaluating the circumstances and to reflect freely towards the Central‟s policies. The result of the first round of interactions was “active co-operation,” which was in line with both the
central and Guangdong governments‟ preferences. After the second round of interactions, they agreed to “partially compromise”; thus, the Guangdong government‟s preference prevailed in this round. This finding corresponds perfectly with the non-zero sum game theory and is evidence of the fact that the compromise favored the Guangdong government‟s preference. However, it is necessary to examine other cases to determine whether the Chinese politics will follow the norms of a non-zero sum game, in accordance with the “Power
Balancing Model.”