本文嘗試從原則理論的角度出發，對於基本權的規範結構和立法餘地(gesetzgeberische Spielr?ume)的問題作一初步的體系性分析。本文首先指出，基本權一方面是法體系中的基本原則，另一方面則具有「最佳化命令」(Optimierungsge?bote)的規範結構特性。其次進一步探討當前德國憲法釋義學上「框架秩序」(Rah?menordnung)論者對於原則理論的批評，前者認為將憲法原則視為最佳化命令，將導致立法者無法享有自主的形成餘地。最後，本文將指出，「最佳化命令」和「框架秩序」並非不相容的概念，在原則理論的基礎之上仍可建構一套立法餘地的理論，它包括結構性餘地(strukturelleSpielr?ume)與認識餘地( epistemische Spielr?ume)兩種不同的類型。考量到最佳化命令的規範結構特質蘊涵了結構性餘地的存在，以及形式原則在認識餘地問題中的角色之後，本文認為原則理論並不會導致過分限縮立法者形成自由的後果。

This essay tries to give a preliminary systematic account of the structure of constitutional rights and legislative discretion (gesetzgebericher Spielraum) from the viewpoint of principle theory. The basic tenet is that constitutional right norms constitute the fundamental principles of legal system and have the structure of optimization requirements (Optimierungsgebote). This essay also scrutinizes some critical arguments from the framework (Rahmenordnung) theory, the main opponent of the principle theory in the contemporary German constitutional doctrine, which claims that the characterization of constitutional principles as optimization requirements would lead to the elimination of all independent decision-taking capacity of the democratically legitimated legislature. However, this essay will argue that the concept of framework and the idea of optimization are not incompatible with each other. On the foundation of principle theory it is possible to construct an adequate doctrine of legislative discr etion consisting of the structural and epistemic discretion. Considering the existence of the structural discretion, which derives from the principle-characters of constitutional rights, and the role of formal principles in the epistemic discretion, this essay concludes that the principle-theoretical construction of constitutional right norms will not excessively reduce the sphere of legislative freedom in shaping the legal system.