當所有權與經營權分離，便產生代理問題，而公司治理機制就是用來監督公司運作及防止不肖經營者掏空公司資產的目的。股權的結構一直被認為是公司治理內部機制的核心之一。文獻上股權結構與公司績效或價值的關係並沒有產生較一致的共識。為了要擴大研究，本文嘗試著發展股權結構與公司價值之關係，經過不同的時間、不同的產業，股權對價值的影響會因而不同嗎？實證的研究發現股權跟公司價值存在一種非單調關係。我們同時發現股權的分割設計相當重要。

Diffuse ownership places significant power in the hands of managers, thereby giving rise to agency problem. Corporate governance thus, focuses on mitigating the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. While ownership structure is considered to be one of the core internal mechanisms of corporate governance, a notable feature of this line of researches is its failure to reach a consensus regarding the nature of the relationship between shareholding and firm value. To extend prior studies, this paper seeks to examine the relation by applying a dynamic perspective to explore the persistence of the relationship by industries
and over time. Our empirical results suggest that a potential non-linear relation exists between shareholding and firm value. We also find that the split specification of ownership structure matters.