本研究結合實質盈餘管理誘因及公司治理二脈文獻，探討董事會特性是否影響管理者因
為門檻壓力而從事實質盈餘管理。以2003 年至2006 年美國上市公司為樣本，本研究實
證結果發現績效門檻( 包括零盈餘、前期盈餘及分析師盈餘預測三項績效門檻) 會誘發
管理者從事實質盈餘管理。此外，當董事會的成員具備較高的獨立性或專業性時，可抑
制績效門檻誘因所導致的實質盈餘管理幅度。本研究之實證結果符合以下觀點：董事會
治理對於抑制實質盈餘管理，係扮演關鍵角色。

This study combines the real-earnings-management literature and the corporate-governance
literature to examine how board characteristics affect real earnings management induced by
benchmark meeting/beating incentives. Using a sample of U.S. listed companies over the
period of 2003-2006, we find that managers are more likely to exercise real earnings
management in order to avoid negative earnings, sustain prior year’s earnings or meet/beat
analysts’ consensus earnings forecast. With regard to the role of board characteristics, our
results indicate that boards with higher independence and professionalism can effectively
constrain earnings-thresholds-induced real earnings management. Our overall findings are
consistent with the notion that board governance plays a vital role in restraining real earnings
management.