國際間標準制訂組織(Standard-setting organization，SSO)，爲了化解制訂標準及硏擬標準 協議的過程中，可能產生之專利箝制(Patenthold-up)及專利內鎖(Patentlock-in)問題，防止關鍵
或必要技術之專利權人在其專利採納爲技術標準後、抬高授權價格索取高額的權利金，通常會 要求其會員或標準制訂參與者應承諾(Commitment)，將以公平、合理及不歧視(Fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory，FRAND)方式將經SSO採納爲正式標準之專利予以授權之條款。
本文除針對目前SSO如何制訂FRAND條款、利用FRAND條款來排除專利箝制及專利內 鎖之情形，以及FRAND條款在美國及歐盟競爭法下是如何被評價，亦針對FRAND條款在使 用上的界線或效用範圍等環節，逐一探討外；並進一步就對國內常見之硏發型不實施法人，目 前如欲藉由參與國際標準制訂活動、透過此換取授權收益之發展策略或規劃，是否可能產生哪 些面向之侷限或影響，提出相關分析與建議。

It is evident that the problem of and serious consequence resulting from the appear of the phenomena of "Patent hold-up’’ and "Patent lock-in", which used to embedded in the procedures of standard-setting, were generally happened and repeated in the past decades. Most national, regional and international Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have planned similar strategies to prevent or avoid the future threaten thereof，which is through providing or requiring the members or participants of the SSOs to comply with the Fair，Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitment of their licensing and the Disclosure clause of their insisting patents.
This article is aiming at analyzing, discussing and explaining the legality and effects of the FRAND commitment in the perspective of competition law respectively from the US and the EU. Furthermore, the author will also try to contemplate the applicability and limitation of the expectation of and the license strategy used by Taiwan domestic research and development institutions under the circumstance above.