本文關於朱熹哲學的探討分成兩部分：第一個部分是「知與行」，第二個部分是「經與權」。「知與行」展示的是道德學的認識要素與行動要素，亦即認知與力行的關係；而「經與權」則由倫理學著眼，分析對常理、常道的掌握及其權衡變通。這些概念（知行與經權）分屬於認識論、倫理學與實踐哲學，並不直接與詮釋學相關聯。但是就經典詮釋來說，如何理解經典中的內容，以及如何根據具體情況來應用這些內容中所涵蘊的真理，則是後代儒者所必須面對的課題。所以知行與經權便有很強的詮釋學意涵。對詮釋時所表現的理解－應用的普遍形式而言，本文嘗試做這樣的說明：在朱熹的論述裹，認識論－實踐論的知行概念，正如倫理學－實踐論的經權概念一樣，展示為某種詮釋學模式。

This article discusses the hermeneutic model in Zhu Xi’s philosophical thinking: the relationship between zhi and xing is treated in the first section, and that between jing and quan in the second. The former section explores issues relating to elements of knowing (zhi) and doing (xing), in the sense of moral philosophy; and the latter, in the light of ethics, ponders the ways of grasping the constant principles (jing), and the ways of carrying them out by expedient measures (quan). These are originally concepts of epistemology, ethics and practical philosophy, not that of hermeneutics. Nonetheless, in the interpretation of classics, a Confucian scholar has to offer advice on how to comprehend the teachings of the texts as well as on how to apply the universal principles in concrete moral situations. In this connection, such ideas as “knowing-doing” and “constancy-expediency” have strong hermeneutical significance. This article argues that in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, both the epistemological-practical model of “knowing-doing” and the ethical-practical model of “constancy-expediency” have hermeneutical dimensions.