德沃金(Ronald Dworkin, 1931-2013)是當代自由主義法學的代表人物之一，其在《生命的自主權》(Life’s Dominion)一書中，認為墮胎爭議主要是兩股極端力量的激盪，一股是極端的保守主義，擁護胎兒的生命權(pro-life)，反對除了挽救母親生命的一切墮胎行為﹔另一股則是極端的自由主義，倡言生育自主權(pro-choice)，容許任何懷孕階段的墮胎行為。但在德沃金眼中這兩股極端，顯然是偏離了墮胎辯論的核心。他認為墮胎議題的關鍵不在於「由權利衍生的觀點」，而是我們應該從反對墮胎的「非權利觀點」去論證「要如何做，才是對人類生命神聖的尊重」，始能緩和各方敵對的立場。本文從三個面向探討德沃金的墮胎倫理學，一是闡述德沃金有關「非權利觀點」、生命內在價值、人類生命神聖等觀點﹔二是評析德沃金論墮胎的道德論證及其疑問﹔三是對德沃金的墮胎倫理學，做出批判性反省，指出他的墮胎倫理學似乎只是要去說服那些原本反對墮胎的人，接受婦女墮胎有時也是生命神聖價值的表現，而國家對於宗教本質的生命神聖，應該保持中立，不能全面禁止墮胎，其結果反而固化了生育自主權！所以，他所謂墮胎倫理學與墮胎法理學的「平行詮釋」(parallel interpretation)，實際上是朝向墮胎法理學「傾斜的」。

Ronald Dworkin(1931-2013) is one of the contemporary representative figures of liberal legalism. In his Life’s Dominion, Dworkin observes that the disputation of abortion indicates the collision of two extreme forces. On the one hand, the extreme pro-life conservatism denounces any kind of abortion unless the mother’s life is at risk in delivering. On the other hand, the extreme pro-choice liberalism tends to support all kinds of abortion during pregnancy. But in Dworkin’s eyes, these two extremities drift off the course of the debate on abortion. He thinks that the key point of this issue is that we should not talk from the ‘derivative view’ of rights but that we have to stand on the pro-life point of view, which is the ‘detached view’, and make argumentation on ‘what and how to do to preserve the respect for the sanctity of human life’ so that the hostility can be reconcile. The study observes Dworkin’s ethics of abortion from three perspectives: 1) a discussion of Dworkin’s ‘detached view’ of rights and the intrinsic value and the sanctity of human life, 2) an analysis of Dworkin’s moral reasoning on the ethics of abortion and the issues involved thereof, and 3) a critical review of Dworkin’s ethics of abortion. Dworkin’s ethics of abortion aims to persuade the pro-life supporters into believing that sometimes abortion is a gesture of the respect for the sanctity of human life. He argues that the government should take a neutral attitude towards the sanctity of human life in light of religious beliefs and cannot put an all-out ban on abortion. Ironically, this results in the consolidation of the autonomy of procreation! Therefore, what he called the ‘parallel interpretations’ on the ethics of abortion and the nomology of abortion is actually an ethics slanting towards the nomology of abortion.