本文之寫作目的在於釐清陳確對程朱理學人性論之批判，瞭解陳確人性論建構之理論根源，以及此批判類型在明清之際學術轉型之意涵。從陳確之思辨脈絡上，首先，確立其對儒家人性論之理論掌握，陳確建構人性論體系之根基在於先秦孔孟性善論與易繼善承性之說，且異於當時知識分子對心學之詰難，確立孔孟至陸王心學一脈人性論體系之承繼關係。再者，在此承繼脈絡上，批駁程朱理學之人性論建構；站在反對形上學、本體論理論建構之必要性的立場，批判孟子性善論與告子自然意義之人性論的結合，進而對程朱理學之性、氣、情、才、本體等概念逐一反駁，一舉推翻。最後，展開對陳確此種論述方式的理論意義之探討。

This paper is to clarify Chen Que’s criticism of the theory of human nature from Cheng-Chu Neo-Confucianism, understand the theoretical origin of his construction of humanism, and see the significance of this type of criticism in the academic transformation during the turn between the Ming and Qing Dynasties. Regarding Cheng’s speculative context, firstly, we affirm his grasp about Confucian theories of human nature and his framework of the theory of human nature as grounded in Confucius and Meng Zi’s doctrines about the goodness of human nature and the “goodness issuing from Tao and completing nature.” Different from his contemporary intellectuals who challenged the doctrine of mind, Chen confirmed the legacy of the doctrine of mind from Confucius and Meng Zi to Lu and Wang. Secondly, regarding the context of this succession, Chen rebutted the doctrine of human nature from Cheng-Chu Neo-Confucianism. Opposing the necessity of constructing metaphysical and ontological theories, Chen disagreed with the combination of Meng’s and Gao Zi’s theories about the goodness of human nature as he refuted and overthrew the Cheng-Chu concepts of nature, Qi, emotion, talent and entity. Finally, we discuss the theoretical meanings of Chen’s discourse.