本文首先將分析兩種孟子「命」的意義，從主客觀兩種角度，以及從性命對揚觀點分析孟子命觀。第二部份則比較歷代注家詮釋孟子命觀基礎的不同，即對孟子的「命」歷代雖有不同看法，但本文並非全盤接受，而是一方面考量其注是否與孟子保有一致性，以盡心為論述起點，另一方面則在方法論上觀察其注解方向能否開啟孟子原有的生命精神，使儒者對「命」的態度更為成熟。第三部份則對前述之注解加以分類與反省，區分出四種實踐孟子命觀之進路，強調孔孟論命的立場，重著於「知其不可為而為之」的大勇、「我欲仁，斯仁致矣」的大仁精神，並在此大勇與大仁的理想層次上指出《論》、《孟》論「命」都偏向純粹理想層次，而非朱子兼論理想與現實兩範疇的方式；但此種偏向並非不周全的哲學選擇，而是一種以內兼外，以理想指導現實發展方向，並能統合盡心與窮理的一以貫之的作法，並依此而彰顯孟子命觀成立之哲學基礎。

This article first explains from the historical perspective the evolution of the Confucian concept of “ming” (命, destiny), pointing out how, from the religious period to the philosophical period, the Confucian concept of “ming” evolved from the “ming” of “ming commanding righteousness” to the “ming” of “ming limiting righteousness, namely, from the separation of destiny from righteous to the unity of destiny and justice, with more and more exploration on the philosopher’s own attitude toward “ming.” Such an attitude is not merely a choice of a single concept but also a formation of the philosopher’s whole values about life; for example, the attitude toward life in The Classic of Poetry, “We should be apprehensive and cautious, as if on the brink of a deep gulf, as if treading on thin ice,” and the personal conviction in Analects, “If a man in the morning hear the right way, he may die in the evening without regret,” belonged to the Confucian view of destiny before Mengzi’s time. In the second part of this paper, the two meanings of Mengzi’s “ming” are pointed out, and Mengzi’s view about “ming” is analyzed from the subjective and objective perspectives as well as the standpoint of the interaction between the inherent quality of being and fate. The third part is to compare how commentators throughout history have interpreted Mengzi’s view of destiny, that is, even though opinions about Mengzi’s idea of “destiny” have varied from dynasty to dynasty, not all the commentaries about Mengzi are presented here. Instead, we consider whether the commentary began with “the exhaustion of one’s mental constitution” and accorded with Mengzi, while on the other hand, in terms of methodology, we observe whether the commentary was oriented toward opening up Mengzi’s intrinsic spirit of life so as to make Confucians’ attitude toward “destiny” more mature. Namely, following these two directions, we select from all the different kinds of commentaries in view of the positive and negative cases. The fourth part is to categorize and reflect on the aforementioned commentaries, distinguishing them into four ways to practice Mengzi’s view of destiny, emphasizing on Confucius’s and Mengzi’s positions toward ming (destiny), stressing the bravery of “doing something even though it is impossible” and the spirit of benevolence in “I wish to be benevolent; and lo, benevolence is at hand," and pointing out at this ideal level of bravery and benevolence that Analects and Mengzi addressed “destiny” more at the level of pure ideal than in the way Ju Xi combined the ideal and the reality. Yet the way Analects and Mengzi did was not an in-comprehensive choice of philosophy; rather, it was a way to make the inner double as the outer, make the ideal direct the development of the reality, and unite coherently the exhaustion of one’s mental constitution and the exhaustion of principles, whereby the philosophical foundation of Mengzi’s view of destiny is manifested.