本文始於討論胡塞爾的《邏輯研究》的〈第一研究〉對「記號」與「信號」的區分，有關問題將涉及到〈第六研究〉。接著對海德格在《存有與時間》第十七節「指涉與記號」（Verweisung und Zeichen） 做闡釋，並延伸到其〈藝術作品的起源〉視記號為一種象徵的另一種觀點。但這裡的記號根本即是胡塞爾所說的信號。海德格所謂的記號能向更深邃涵義去指引，胡塞爾以記號能清楚明白表達意義，二者的立場因此有所不同。

This article begins with the discussion of Husserl’s differentiation of sign and indication in his “First Investigation” of Logical Investigations, referring to the “Six Investigation” regarding some issues. Then the theme of “References and Signs” in the §17 of Heidegger’s Being and Time will be explicated, extending to “The Origin of the Work of Art,” where the sign is viewed as a symbol. However, what the sign is meant by Heidegger in origin means the indication by Husserl. The so-called sign by Heidegger can indicate a more profound meaning; sign by Husserl can clearly and distinctly express meanings, therefore their positions are different.