美國學者Christine Korsgaard以道德行動者（moral agent）概念詮釋康德倫理學，並應用於心靈哲學之討論，以此為論據反駁化約論者（reductionist）如Derek Parfit不存在自我同一性（personal identity）的觀點。Korsgaard發揮康德以理論與實踐理性雙重立場看人的論點，指出從理論面來看，行為只是經驗，注重的是對人的自然面之解釋與預測；在實踐層面上，行動必須有行動者，所謂同一性，正是人身為道德行動者之行動能力與選擇自由，以作為責任之載體，同時自我建構為某種人格表現。且無須涉及任何形上學事實之肯定。質言之，肯定人作為道德行動者乃儒家與Korsgaard之共識。就王陽明而言，良知即是真己、即是道德自我、人的道德選擇與行動能力。此動能不但能明辨善惡，對吾人之妄念、私欲具有省察之作用，更是事親與仁民愛物等道德行為之推動力。自我同一性的表現，必須從突顯人主動的實踐面著手，使視聽言動皆以良知為主而不逾矩，此即致知與誠意的工夫。不難看出，陽明論述不乏與Korsgaard呼應之處，他對如何藉由道德實踐將自我建構導向正途的說明，亦可為其論點提供補充。但須注意的是，良知作為道德自我，同時具有倫理學與形上學的雙重角色；Korsgaard則極力避免涉入形上學之論證爭議。這導致雙方對道德動能界定上的存有論差異，也成為彼此對話交流中必須予以正視的問題。

Christine Korsgaard spotlights the notion of moral agency and thereby refutes the Reductionist thesis of Derek Parfit. Parfit claims that personal identity just involves physical and psychological continuity, which can be described in an impersonal way and without claiming that experiences are had by a person. Instead Korsgaard regards persons primarily as agents, and stresses the importance of viewing ourselves both from the theoretical and the practical standpoints. From the theoretical standpoint, an action may be viewed as just another experience, but from the practical standpoint, actions and choices must be viewed as having agents and choosers. This is what makes them our own actions and choices as well as contributes to the process of self-constitution. Personal identity as the chooser of our desires and author of our actions can be thought of as the common denominator between Korsgaard and Wang Yangming. For liangzhi is none other than the agency that acts as the capacity for moral judgment and the motivation of performing moral actions. It not only expresses one’s authentic self but steers the process of self-constitution to the right path. However, for all the common ground, there still exists a significant divergence where Korsgaard emphasizes that personal identity has nothing to do with metaphysical fact while the two dimensions of liangzhi, ontological and ethical, are intertwined with each other.