中國大陸的財政轉移支付制度呈現反均等化的特徵，本文分析這種反均等化財政轉移支付制度背後的邏輯。我們認為，中國大陸現行財政轉移支付制度的形成及運作，是市場化轉型過程中，中央的改革策略（分權與政府退縮）、財政制度變遷（財政包乾制和分稅制）、中央與地方博弈共同作用的結果。準此，雖然分稅制改革前（1979~1993）與分稅制改革後（1994～迄今）的財政轉移支付都沒有達成均等化目標，但兩者背後的運作機理有所不同。分稅制改革前，財政轉移支付的反均等化是因為中央政府的財政收入大幅減少，由而衍生政府退縮（減少支出）之結果；分稅制改革後，財政轉移支付的反均等化，是中央－地方博弈後制度設計（稅收返還和專項轉移支付）的結果。

This paper attempts to shed light on institutional foundation of China’s fiscal transfer system which has an anti-equalization effect on imbalanced subnational fiscal revenue and expenditure. We argue that formation and operation of China’s current fiscal transfer system are interactive results of market transformation, central reform strategies（such as decentralization and government retreat）, institutional changes（such as fiscal contract system and tax-sharing system）, and interactions between central and subnational governments. Therefore, while fiscal transfer either in fiscal contract system（1979~1993）or tax-sharing system（1994 to date）has failed in carrying out equalization targets, operation mechanisms behind the two differ. Under the fiscal contract system, anti-equalized fiscal transfer is an outcome of reduction of central government’s revenue and government retreat （reduce spending）due to decentralized reform. In contrast, anti-equalized fiscal transfer under the tax-sharing system results from institutional design （tax rebates and specific transfer payments）formed by the dynamics of central-local relations.