胡塞爾的他者構造理論雖然扮演著重要作用，但也招致了諸多批評。以許慈為代表的批評者認為該理論事實上是一個不成熟的理論。他們通過檢討第五《笛卡爾式沉思》，認為胡塞爾的他者理論預設了一種自然主義立場，而這一立場原則上與胡塞爾的超越論立場相悖。本文通過重構胡塞爾的類比理論並分析他的研究手稿，檢討上述自然主義批評，認為胡塞爾事實上還提出了一種與自然主義立場不同的人格主義立場。根據該立場，對他者的經驗首先是對他者身體之為「表達性統一體」的經驗，而不是以他者軀體作為構造的出發點；其次，這種經驗是一種源初的、直接的感知行為，而不是以自我為仲介的虛擬意識；再次，人格主義為自然主義立場提供了基礎，並且與胡塞爾的超越論立場相契合。

Husserl’s constitutional theory of the Other plays an important role in his philosophy, yet it also incurs lots of criticisms. Many commentators such as Alfred Schutz argue that Husserl’s theory of the Other is in fact unsuccessful in that they find it ultimately presupposes a sort of naturalism that is in principle incompatible with Husserl’s transcendentalism. This paper replies this criticism by taking stock at Husserl’s theory of the Other as it is developed in texts such as Ideas II. I argue that, contrary to naturalism, Husserl actually develops a personalistic theory of the Other, according to which the Other’s body is given as an “expressive unity” rather than a mere physical body, and empathic experience is an original and direct perception rather than a fictive consciousness, and personalism thus understood lays ground for naturalism and is compatible with Husserl’s transcendentalism.