本文以經營階層收購為研究對象，簡要回顧其於美國併購交易實務上的發展 經過，並思辨此一交易型態，與控制股東收購、逐出少數股東、現金逐出合併、 槓桿交易與下市交易等交易種類之關係，以釐清其內涵，並藉由美國法上關於經 營階層收購之正反觀點的觀察與介紹，檢視其與一般併購交易之異同，而在此一 基礎上，主張經營階層收購就整體社會經濟而言，有其正面價值，然不可諱言亦 有其影響股東權益之一面，而應予適度管控，然尚無須對之抱持全然否定的態 度。 在此認知下，本文接續分析美國法上對於經營階層收購所生流弊所發展出來 的矯治措施，而歸類為資訊揭露、程序機制與司法審查三者，彼此之間環環相 扣。對照我國目前法制，本文認為雖然企業併購新法於2016 年生效後，引入獨立 委員會制度，然該委員會應如何運作、應如何引導出售程序妥適進行，仍付之闕 如，其他相應於美國法上之矯治措施，如資訊揭露及司法審查等，則若非甚為簡陋，即未被充分運用，而有不足，就此而言，本文認為或可藉由自律規則或行政
指導的方式，形成經營階層收購程序之通案性指引，再輔以司法審查為事後監督
機制，以形成經營階層收購之完整監督機制。

This article starts from brief review of the history of management buyout (“MBO”) in the US and examines its difference from freezout, cash-out merger, leveraged buyout and going private transactions to clarify the characteristics of MBO. Then this article introduces the debate surrounding MBO, arguing that MBO has its benefit despite the potential negative impact on shareholder rights and thus should be regulated but not outright forbidden. This article also analyzes the three mechanisms to scrutinize MBO: information disclosure, procedural mechanism and judicial review. Looking at the regulation in Taiwan, this article argues that the new Merger and Acquisition Act has introduced the independence committee concept in 2016, but further guidance is absent regarding how to steer though the sale of company process in the MBO context. As for the regulations with respect to information disclosure and judicial review, they are either insufficiently provided or rarely utilized. This article suggests the procedural guidance can be established in the form of self-regulation and administrative instruction, which can, combining with the application of judicial review, form a complete scrutiny mechanism to MBO.