近年來，政府針對食品安全的規定與法令日趨嚴格，並輔以相關的認 證制度作為配套，但仍無法遏止國內食品安全問題層出不窮。如此，不僅 嚴重影響、危害國人健康，對於相關產品之企業組織與產業亦造成巨大負 面影響。本文從經濟學之契約理論與行銷管理出發，針對我國食品安全之 困境，引介誘因契約設計與運銷管理策略，解決市場訊息不對稱的問題。 以台灣肉雞產業為背景，以產銷行為模式設計理論模型架構、推導結果， 形成政策建議。 模型結果顯示，肉雞可在未屠宰前，因契約交易，高品質肉雞可得到 質量溢價，而低品質肉雞會因品質折扣，其契約價格低於預期現貨價格。 再者，當假設雞農為風險趨避者，在誘因契約設計下，不論高低類型的雞 農都會將其所有的雞隻供給契約市場，現貨市場因而消失。若當雞農為風 險中立者，高類型雞農仍因質量溢價，全數採契約交易，而低類型雞農則 視契約交易與現貨交易無差異，因此現貨市場存在。換言之，此時僅低類 型雞農供給現貨市場。本文政策建議為，相關政府單位應該為市場提供有 效的工具，即通過品質訊號（市場訊息），認證（品質保證）以及處罰 (檢驗）等機制，有效管理產品品質，方可降低此類食安問題的發生，為 我國農產業創造競爭力與增進國民福祉。

The goal of this paper is to develop an understanding of how contract design in the presence of asymmetric information can influence price level, quantity, and quality. This paper shows what optimal incentive contracts require as adverse selection and/or moral hazard occur, and further solves some related food safety problems. The theoretical model setting is based on Taiwan farmed chicken market. The results show that the high quality farmer receives a quality premium on forward contracts, whereas the low quality farmer receives a forward contract price that is lower than the expected spot price due to quality. In addition, when both type farmers are risk averse, under the optimal incentive contracts offered by the processing firm, the high and the low quality farmers supply their total production to the forward contract market. However, when the farmers are risk-neutral, the low quality farmers can bear all the risks. They are indifferent to supply between forward contracts and spot markets. Since the high quality still are fully hedged because of quality pricing in forward contracts, only low quality meat is traded in the spot market.