本研究基於管理階層權力理論、競賽 理論與行為理論，以2009〜2014年台灣電 子業上市、上櫃公司做為研究對象，探討 高階經理人權力、薪酬差距、創新績效與 經營績效間之關係，並且運用結構方程模 式以補充過去研究文獻與研究方法之不 足。研究結果主要發現：（1)高階經理人所 有權權力對薪酬差距具有顯著正向影響， 表示高階經理人持股比例愈高，則薪酬差 距愈大；（2)薪酬差距的擴大，將促進公司 創新數量績效與經營績效的成長；（3)高階 經理人所有權權力會直接對會計績效產生 正向影響，也會透過薪酬差距的擴大，進 一步對公司創新數量績效與經營績效產生 正向影響；（4)高階經理人的結構權力會直 接對創新績效與會計績效產生正向影響， 然而，高階經理人的結構權力也會透過與 薪酬差距反向的關係間接負向影響創新數 量績效與經營績效。

Based on managerial power theory, tournament theory and behavioral theory, this paper examines the relationships among top management power, compensation gap, innovation performance, and operating performance for Taiwan listed electronics industry companies from 2009 to 2014. We also apply stmctural equation modeling (SEM) to complement previous literature and research methods. The main fin-dings are as follows: (1) Top managements ownership power has a significant and positive impact on compensation gap, indicating that the higher proportion of ownership for senior managers, the greater the compensation gap; (2) The widening compensation gap enhances innovation quantity performance and operating perform-ance; (3) Top management’s ownership power has a positive and direct impact on ac-counting performance, and a positive and indirect effect on innovation quantity performance and operating performance through the expansion of compensation gap; (4) Top management’s structural power has a positive and direct effect on innovation performance and accounting performance. However, top managemenfs structural power also indirectly affect innovation quantity performance and operating performance through the negative relationship with compensation gap.