多瑪斯將出自奥斯定傳統的意志概念引入亞里斯多德式 的倫理學，取代其原有的希望概念。這造成了多瑪斯與亞里斯多德倫 理學的何種差異，為學界所爭論。本文認為，多瑪斯的意志依託於理 智，意志之為人性行為的始點，與理智相互包含，一同運作。引入意 志概念後，多瑪斯對人性行為的解釋更為統一且更為理性化。亞里斯 多德的希望則出自習常用語，它首要指對未來的籌畫，亦指籠統的欲 求，作為理性欲求的希望並不總是倫理行為的始點。亞里斯多德更為 強調不同類型的人的欲望品質有別。此外，多瑪斯的意志理論有其自 然法思想作為支撐。律法的普遍自明性使多瑪斯更為強調倫理德性。 亞里斯多德處沒有多瑪斯式的自然法，「好人的理智」而非律法是行 為標準的最終權威。相應地，審慎在亞里斯多德的倫理學中有著更廣 闊的空間。

Aquinas introduces the concept will into Aristotelian ethics which replaces the original concept wish. Academics have been debating what differences does it cause between their ethics. This article argues that Aquinas’ will is interdependent with intellect and as the starting point of moral actions, it works together with intellect. With the introduction of will, Aquinas’ interpretation of human behavior is more generalized and more rationalized. Aristotle’s wish comes from common usage. It refers primarily to the planning of the future, and also desire in general. As rational desire, wish is not always the starting point of moral actions. Aristotle emphasizes the different qualities of desire of different types of people. Further, Aquinas’ theory of will has its root in his idea of natural law. The universal self-evident nature of law makes Aquinas emphasis more on moral virtues. Aristotle doesn’t have the Thomasian natural law. For him, The “the reason of good man” rather than the law is the ultimate authority of moral standard. Accordingly, prudence has more space in Aristotle’s ethics. Under the domination of utilitarism and deontology in ethics, by showing the two sages’ different views on desire, I hope, this article could help us to reflect on the modern understanding of soul and good.