本研究利用1992 年到2012 年美國商業銀行的資料， 探討經理人誘因(CEO incentives) 與銀行流動性管理的議題。實證分析顯示美國銀行經理人誘因會影響銀 行的流動準備，但對S&P 1,500 銀行與非S&P 1,500 銀行的影響效果不同。CEO 持 股較高的S&P 1,500 銀行，通常承做較低比例的承諾性放款和較多的傳統商業銀行 業務，且維持較高的流動性。研究也發現，在S&P 1,500 銀行中，不同CEO 誘因的 會影響銀行的放款決策，進而影響銀行的流動性與營收表現，但此關係在非S&P 1,500 銀行中並不明顯。本研究結果有助於進一步瞭解銀行經理人誘因對銀行流動 性的影響。

We investigate the association between CEO incentives and liquidity policy of commercial banks in the United States from 1992 to 2012. Empirical analyses indicate that CEO incentives affected the liquidity holdings of commercial banks, but the effect was different for S&P 1,500 and non-S&P 1,500 banks. We found that S&P 1,500 banks with higher CEO equity ownership usually had lower proportions of loan commitments, were less involved in non-interest generating activities, but maintained higher levels of liquidity. Our study indicates that S&P 1,500 banks with different level of CEO incentives had different business policies, which affected bank liquidity holdings and bank performance, but this relation was not clear for non-S&P 1,500 banks. Our results complement current understanding of how different CEO incentives affect bank liquidity policy.