篇名 | 論將規範理由視為應然證據的正確方式 |
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卷期 | 41 |
並列篇名 | On How to Take Normative Reasons to be Evidence about Oughts |
作者 | 李國揚 |
頁次 | 001-033 |
關鍵字 | 規範理由 、 應然證據 、 理由 、 證據 、 理由論 、 normative reason 、 evidence about oughts 、 reason 、 evidence 、 theory of reasons 、 THCI |
出刊日期 | 202002 |
證據理由論認為,規範理由 (normative reasons) 是一種證據,有關主體應該(或不應該)從事某個行為的命題的證據。肯恩 (Stephen Kearns) 與斯塔 (Daniel Star) 的理論,是目前最主要的證據理由論。本文的目的,在於藉由分析肯恩與斯塔理論的缺點,而發展出更合理的證據理由論。對肯恩與斯塔來說,F 是支持S 去做行為Ф的理由,當且僅當,F 是支持『S 應該去做Ф』這個命題的證據。而筆者主張,F 是支持S 去做行為Ф的理由,當且僅當,F是反對『S 應該不去做Ф』這個命題的證據。
According to reasons evidentialism, normative reasons are evidence about oughts, i.e. propositions about whether an agent ought or ought not to perform a certain action. Stephen Kearns and Danial Star’s account of reasons have been the most prominent reasons evidentialism on the table. In this paper, I will closely examine Kearns and Star’s account and articulate its problems. More importantly, learning from the drawback of Kearns and Star’s account, I propose a new account of reasons evidentialism. According to Kearns and Star, F is a reason for S to Ф if and only if F is evidence for the proposition that S ought to Ф. On my view, F is a reason for S to Ф if and only if F is evidence against the proposition that S ought not to Ф.