本研究探討現金持有於高階主管股票選擇權(ESOs)誘發之風險承擔行為之影響，以企業併購作為衡量指標。實證發現公司持有超額現金將有助於提升高階主管因ESOs風險誘因而進行併購決策之機率。當持有超額現金，高階主管因ESOs而進行併購之機率顯著高於未持有超額現金公司之併購機率，差異約達7.58%。同時，超額現金對於因ESOs而進行併購決策之正向影響，在低負債企業與隸屬舊經濟產業之公司中較為明顯。此外，透過宣告效果與績效表現之分析，市場對於超額現金公司因ESOs而併購之決策較傾向認定為預防性動機所致。雖此決策將有助公司未來營運績效，但市場如何衡量其併購後評價仍取決於其公司治理環境。

This study examines the effect of corporate cash holdings on the risk-taking activities induced by executive stock options (ESOs). Using mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as the proxy of corporate decisions more associated with idiosyncratic risk taking, we find excess cash holdings stimulate the M&A bidding probability induced by the risk incentive of ESOs (vega). The probability of conducting ESOs-induced M&As in cash-rich firms is 7.58% higher than that in non-cash-rich firms. The positive impact of excess cash on the ESOs-induced M&A decisions is more pronounced in firms with low leverage and those in the old economy. Through analyses of the announcement effect and the one-year profitability effect, our results show the market considers the ESOs-induced M&A decisions made by cash-rich firms are more associated with precautionary motives rather than agency incentives. However, while cash-rich firms undertaking ESOs-induced M&As have better profitability than those not conducting ESOs-induced M&As, how the market assigns future valuations to cash-rich firms conducting ESOs-induced M&As still depends on the corporate governance environment of these firms.