運氣平等主義一般主張人們應對源於自己的選擇的不平等負全部責任，社會應消除非選擇的所有不平等。這種嚴苛的基本立場使它受到了批評。運氣平等主義可以持一種溫和的基本立場：既不允許選擇的所有不平等，也不要求消除所有非選擇的不平等。儘管人們做出不明智的選擇是常見的，但是，人們在生活中必須經常選擇，選擇體現了人們的主體性和平等的道德主體地位，平等的生命和生活機會是比分配平等更基本的平等觀念。在一些極端情況下，運氣平等主義必須接受社會應補償壞的選項運氣造成的危害嚴重的不平等。儘管我們不能絕對區分選擇和運氣，但是，正是由於這個不精確的區分可以為羅爾斯的差別原則提供一個合理的基礎，也為平等主義理論及其實施所必需。

Generally luck egalitarianism requires that persons should be responsibilities for all inequalities caused by their choices, while society should eliminate all inequalities due to luck. This demanding position has triggered many criticisms. Luck egalitarianism, however, can hold a moderate position, that is, it does not permit all inequalities resulting from choices, nor does it require to eliminate all inequalities due to luck. Although people often make imprudent choices, and they have to make frequent choices in their lives, choice is the thing that shows their subjectivity and their being equal moral subjects. Under some extreme circumstances, luck egalitarianism has to accept that society should compensate severe inequalities caused by bad option luck. We cannot make a clear-cut distinction between choice and luck, but it is this imprecise distinction that can provide a reasonable basis for Rawls’s difference principle, and is a necessary device in the construction of theories of egalitarian distributive justice and their application.