篇名 | 唐君毅對黃宗羲哲學之評價 |
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卷期 | 48:5=564 |
並列篇名 | Tang Jun-yi’s Evaluation of Huang Zong-xi’s Philosophy |
作者 | 蔡家和 |
頁次 | 005-026 |
關鍵字 | 唐君毅 、 黃宗羲 、 清代 、 事勢之理 、 向外 、 Tang Jun-yi 、 Huang Zong-xi 、 The Qing Dynasty 、 Circumstantial Nature 、 Outwardly 、 A&HCI |
出刊日期 | 202105 |
本文探討唐君毅先生對於黃宗羲思想及其時代風氣之評價。黃宗羲身處明、清之際,屬明代之遺民,如此則該歸於明代或清代學術呢?唐先生視黃氏為清儒,原因在於黃氏雖有宋明理學之義理,但在時代風氣上,已往經世致用之實學發展,特別是對歷史的重視,其《明夷待訪錄》乃一闡釋外王事功之專著;相較於宋明儒學之重視心性以求天理的學術特徵,黃氏則轉為外開、下開的心學、氣學發展,以及對外王、歷史的強調。再者,黃氏雖屬心學,但其《明儒學案》的編寫,乃以史實、樸實角度而來給予每一位儒者地位——不論其人屬於何種學派;此乃史學家的訓練,比起古典心學,更能客觀地看待並尊重每個人的實修工夫。簡而言之,黃氏心學乃是結合了心學家的內在之道,以及朱子理學的重知傳統,此為內聖之義理;並因明朝亡之反省,而開出外王之道。最後,黃氏又將氣質之性與義理之性予以合一,修正了朱子的二元論性,此種做法更能合於客觀義理,並且回到經典自身的內在詮釋,不同於程朱理學的建構性詮釋。
This article is about Tang Jun-yi’s evaluations of Huang Zong-xi’s thoughts and the atmosphere of his time. Should Huang be seen as a scholar of the Ming or the Qing Dynasties as he was born at the turn of the dynasty? Tang sees him as a Confucian of the Qing Dynasty, since, in terms of Zeitgeist, Huang is much more pragmatic and values history emphatically, and his work, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince, is a monograph on kingliness and legacy. In comparison with the Confucians of the Song and Qing Dynasties who emphasize on mind-nature and heavenly principles, Huang is more outwardly and downwardly oriented with his doctrines on mind and qi and values kingliness and history in particular. Furthermore, while being a philosopher of mind, Huang’s Records of Ming Scholars estimates every Confucian in a historical and modest way regardless of which school they belong to. This is the training of a historian, which enables him to evaluate and respect every individual’s self-cultivation more objectively than the classical doctrine of mind does. To put it simply, Huang’s doctrine of mind combines the innate cultivation of a philosopher of mind and the erudite tradition of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism, which is the morality of a sage, before the fall of the Ming Dynasty makes him reflect and develops the way of a king. Finally, Huang unifies psychophysical nature and moral nature and rectifies the dualism of Zhu Xi’s doctrine. Such a unification is more appropriate to objective morality and, unlike Chengs’ and Zhu’s constructive interpretations, returns to the interpretations within the classical texts themselves.