本文考察了胡塞爾在實踐哲學中的「我能」概念，指出胡塞爾的「我能」概念與經驗歸納的「我能」相區別，需在先驗的（獨立於經驗的）意義上被理解，即在純粹意識中體驗到的「我能」。而Christian、Hanne、Luis等在分析了胡塞爾的相關文本之後，認為應該把「我能」放置於環境中瞭解，通過形成習慣而被體驗到，在本能中有其發生的基礎。本文進一步檢討學者們對胡塞爾「我能」概念的理解，指出胡塞爾對「我能」分析仍然堅持先驗現象學的觀點，並駁斥自然主義的理解方式。

This paper examines Husserl’s concept of “I can” in practical philosophy, and points out that Husserl’s concept of “I can” is distinct from the empirically inductive “I can”, which needs to be understood in an a priori (independent of experience) sense, i.e., the in pure consciousness experienced “I can”. In contrast, Christian, Hanne, Luis, after analyzing Husserl’s texts, argue that “I can” should not be understood in an a priori sense, but rather in the context and could be experienced through habit and based in instinct. This paper further reviews scholars’ understanding of Husserl’s concept of “I can”, points out that Husserl’s analysis of “I can” still adheres to the a priori phenomenological viewpoint, and refutes the naturalistic way of interpretation.