本文主要討論命題態度問題，集中於專名的情形，考察直接指稱理論如何解決它。文章首先釐清什麼是命題態度難題。而後，文章參照蒯因的關係∕記法和透明∕晦暗兩組區分，論證這兩組區分不相同，並以此說明我們應該如何解讀命題態度報告語句。之後，文章轉向薩蒙應對命題態度問題的方案，以及瑞卡納蒂的反駁意見。最後，針對瑞卡納蒂的兩個反駁，文章站在薩蒙的立場上，為他的方案辯護：反駁可及原則以應對瑞卡納蒂的反駁一；針對反駁二說明命題態度報告語句遭到否定的情形。

This essay mainly deals with puzzles about propositional attitude report, focusing on proper names, trying to find out how direct reference theory can find a way out of the puzzle. First and foremost, the essay will clarify what does “puzzles about propositional attitude report” mean. Then, we introduce Quine’s distinction between relational/ notational reading and transparent/ opaque circumstances, and argue that the two distinctions are different. By applying the two distinction, we can analyze propositional attitude report. After that, we investigate Salmon’s solution to the puzzle and Recanati’s objection against Salmon. Finally, in response to Recanati’s rebuttal, we will consider how Salmon can reply to it. Against the first rebuttal, we will show why the Availability Principle fails. Against the second rebuttal, we will illustrate how Salmon explains the circumstance when propositional attitude report is negated.