斯洛特的道德情感主義理論提供了一種獨特的道德規範性方案，即通過先天道德情感的運作來確定道德善惡的區分，並解釋道德的規範力量難題。該方案的重點在於，定位先天的道德情感，以解釋情感何以能滿足道德規範性的要求。但這一方案所得出的結論僅適用於一種諸如「善」、「惡」這樣的「道德薄概念」（morally thin concept），而「好人」或者「美德」並非「道德薄概念」所能涵蓋的，因為這樣的道德概念與具體的「人」或「性情」發生關聯，有一厚重的實踐指向。道德規範性所呈現的是一種穩定的「實踐承諾」（practical commitments），它涉及到更多實踐方面的預設，因此需要由種種「道德方面厚的」（morally thick）概念所構成，而這正是道德規範性的先天情感方案仍需進一步補充的要點所在。

Moral sentimentalism provides a unique account of moral normativity, which distinguishes moral good and evil by the operation of a mechanism of a priori sentiments and explains the normative force of morality. This sentimentalist account focuses on locating the a priori moral sentiments to illustrate how moral sentiments could meet the requirements of moral normativity. However, the conclusion of this account can only apply to “morally thin concepts” like “good” and “evil”, as “virtuous man” or “virtues” can’t be covered just by these morally thin concepts for the reason that those concepts are related to concrete “man” or “dispositions” with thick practical references. What moral normativity represents is a stable “practical commitment” concerning lots of practical prescriptions, so it should consist of “morally thick” concepts. These are the key points that a priori sentimentalist account for normativity needs to add.