本文從「基礎主義」與「反基礎主義」的爭論重新省察中觀學派和正理學派的哲學交涉。「基礎主義」指的是理性主義知識論訴諸直觀或演繹，或經驗主義者訴諸經驗性觀察或歸納，作為證成知識信念的基礎；換言之，基礎主義者主張信念的證成必須經過直接的認識，如直觀或觀察，或是基於直觀或觀察而來的信念的推理過程，如演繹或歸納。正理學派的量論或佛教唯識學派主張知識的基礎來自「量」，不論是二量（現量與比量）、三量（現量、比量、譬喻量）或四量（現量、比量、譬喻量、聖言量）。龍樹則批評這種帶有基礎主義形上預設的量論，認為「量」本身並無「自性」，因此無法透過「自成」（內部證成）或「他成」（外部證成）的方式成為知識的基礎，也批評量論者必然落入無限後退的論證困境。龍樹顯然是站在批判「基礎主義」的立場。更重要的是，知識論上的「基礎主義」與「反基礎主義」的爭論有其倫理學和解脫論的實踐效應，而這正是龍樹所以批判「量論」或「基礎主義」的真正旨趣。換言之，龍樹在《迴諍論》中針對知識論和語言哲學的討論，最終指向批判基礎主義的形上學及其負面的倫理學和解脫論效應。

This paper examines the philosophical debate between Nagarjuna and Nyaiyayikas recorded in the Vigrahavyavartani. Nagarjuna’s position is construed in this paper as a critique of metaphysical, epistemological and ethical foundationalism. For Nagarjuna, the validity of foundationalist logic and epistemology, as argued by Nyaiyayikas and Buddhist logicians, is untenable because it is rooted in another untenable metaphysical notion of self-identity (svabhava). The metaphysical presupposition of self-identity would lead to the fallacy of infinite regress. Nagarjuna also contends that the fallacy of foundationalist epistemology has to do with reference theory, both of which are all rooted in the notion of self-identity. Finally, this paper concludes that foundationalism manifests as the pathological syndrome of Cartesianism.