本研究以不完全資訊競局模型的角度來探討審計人員（auditor）和其客戶（client）間的策略性互動。模式中允許「多重客戶類別」（multiple client types），且假設客戶之類別乃是客戶的私有訊息（private information）。本文的主要結論乃是推翻Fellingham & Newman（1985, The Accounting Review）中「加強審計程序且誠實發佈審計報告」（“extend the audit and issue the report truthfully”），不是會計師的純粹策略均衡解（pure strategy equilibrium solution）的看法。並証明在合適的條件下，加強審計程序且誠實發佈審計報告仍是會計師的最佳策略。

In this study, an auditor-client incomplete information game is introduced to analyze auditor-client interactions. The model formally recognizes the effect of allowing for multiple client types and demonstrates that as long as some sufficient conditions hold, the “standard” strategy of extending the audit and report truthfully can become a pure strategy equilibrium solution of the auditor.