合理管理費應收取多少，方能降低代理人問題，一直為誘因契約（incentive contract）文獻所探討之議題。早期誘因契約模型是採用Margrabe（1978）資產交換選擇權定價模型，評價相對績效（relative performance）誘因契約，然而於該模型中，當盯價錯誤標準差越大時，資產交換選擇權的價格亦越大，也就是管理費越高，此會造成基金經理人有可能恣意地（discretionary）提高投資組合的風險，以獲得更高的管理費，產生嚴重的德危機（moral hazard）問題。Kritzman and Rich（1998）針對相對績效下誘因契約的缺失，提出雙重績效限制，減低代理問題的嚴重程度。但事實上，Kritzman and Rich（1998）一文對於降低代理人問題之效果非常有限，此外這些既有之誘因契約，均無法保障投資者之最低資產價值，值此之故，本研究擬設計一最低資產保障之管理費收費準則，於此準則下，不僅能考量到經理人的努力程度，同時亦能大幅降低道德危機之代理問題。同時本研究亦輔以數值模擬的方法，檢視一些重要參數變動對本模型所設計之管理費的影響，並與既有模型進行比較與分析。

An efficient incentive contract to reduce the principal － agent problem is always an important issue in previous literature. Among earlier studies, Margrabe (1978) presented an incentive contract with exchangeablel option pricing model to evaluate the manager's relative performance. But in this model, an increase in the tracking error (the volatility) will lead to an increase in management fee. Hence, this will offer a motivation for manager to discretionarily increase the portfolio risk to prusue a higher management fee and thus cause the serious moral hazard. Kritzman and Rich (1998) extended Margrabe (1978) relative performance model and proposed a multivariate model in which combines the relative performance and an absolute performance to reduce the degree of the principal- agent problem. However Kritzman and Rich (1998) only provided little improvement in reducing moral hazard problem. Therefore, this paper intends to derive a portfolio insurance pricing model for incentive fund management fee, which not only can truly reflect the effort and ability of the fund manager but effectively weaken the moral hazard problem as well. Additionally, in this projcct we also use numerical simulation method to analyze for the effects of some parametric change on incentive fund management fee and compare the results of this model with those of other prior incentive contract models based on alternative assumption.