國內證券市場普遍存在利益輸送的行為，本文擴展Leland和Pyle ( 1977 )的訊息傳遞模型，探討利益輸送金額的決定因素以及企業主持股比率之訊息傳遞效果。本文的結論為：(1) 分析利益輸送金額的六個決定因素──企業主持股比率、廠商的特定風險程度、邊際處罰成本、企業主運用利益輸送金額所獲取之報酬、廠商未來現金流量的期望值以及企業主風險規避程度等，與利益輸送金額的關係。(2) 有關持股比率的訊息傳遞效果，我們得出當企業主持股比率大於臨界值，則持股比率增加所傳遞給投資者的訊息具有雙重效果──未來現金流量期望值越大，利益輸送金額越小；另一方面，當持股比率小於臨界值，則持股比率增加所傳遞給投資者的訊息具有抵消效果──雖然未來現金流量期望值越大，但是利益輸送金額也越大。

This paper extends Lehand and Pyle( 1977 ) model to include the possibility that manager may exploit corporate wealth through transactions with affiliated companies and/or individuals. The results of our model indicate that the amounts of wealth ex-ploitation are affected by a number of factors. They are: managerial stockholding, the severity of penalty, the manager's risk attitude, firm's expected future cash flows, and the variance of future cash flows. Moreover, the relation between managerial holding and the amount of wealth exploitation is not monotonic. Wealth exploitation rises with management share holdings before the break point. When managerial holding exceeds the break point, any further increase in the management holdings will decrease the amount of wealth exploitation.