關係專屬投資可增加交易的效率，但礙於資源移轉的困難，也使得交易成本增加。台灣的代工廠商處於相對弱勢的地位，不容易在交易初期就要求品牌客戶對其所承諾的關係專屬投資，給予對等的保護或抵押。在資源有限的情況下，代工廠商傾向以單邊關係專屬投資作為抵押，以爭取合作機會，並在合作過程中累積能力來降低套牢的威脅。根據文獻和五個台灣代工廠商的個案資料，本研究發現關係專屬投資應區分成兩個次構面，分別是「關係投資幅度」與「資產專屬程度」。據此整合抵押模式與能力觀點，提出關係專屬投資與統理機制選擇的原則。

Relation-specific investment creates an inherent dilemma as, although it increases transaction value, it also increases transaction costs for the investing party. Due to their low bargaining position, Taiwanese suppliers cannot demand any formal protection or legal assurance from international brand vendors for their relation-specific investments. Given their resource constraints, we find that Taiwanese suppliers tend to use unilateral relationspecific investments as a hostage to gain opportunities to cooperate with clients. Through this cooperation they may upgrade their capability and decrease the threat of meeting holdups. We argue that relation-specific investment is a multidimensional construct which includes relational investment and asset specificity. We also use two theoretical perspectives, the hostage theory and the capability-based view, to model the governance adopted by smaller suppliers in protecting relation-specific investment.