「一戰二和三撫」是關東軍的作戰策?三部曲。面對???的東?軍，關東軍主「戰」，因為掌握南滿鐵?可謂是關東軍的首要作戰目標。除?掌握運輸線，確保軍隊的調動自如的軍事上目的以外，南滿鐵?沿線的25個城市，本?就是東?的精華區。掌握?鐵?，自然也就掌握?這些沿線都市，掌握?這些精華區，???也就大致底定。至於對付吉??，關東軍是主「和」的。吉??代?主席熙洽能於事變爆發後的第3天，開城迎敵，第10天就?眾投?。這份效?，這份默?無一?在?明，熙洽在事變期所有的活動，皆是精心設計下的產物。特別是熙洽一顆棋子，就能讓吉??7個步兵?、1個騎兵?，85%的步兵、100%的騎兵放棄抵抗甘願接受關東軍收編，由此也可??到關東軍在政治謀?上的成效。對付黑?江?，關東軍則以「撫」為主軸，黑?江?俗稱?滿，原本就是蘇?的勢?範圍區，日本在當地本為勢?，借用特區長官，也就是東?政界耆?張景惠在東?政界、軍界的影響?，安撫黑?江?的地方勢?是關東軍在事變初期所擬定的政治謀?。相較於關東軍的「一戰二和三撫」，東?軍卻以「拒戰、懼戰、觀戰」為回應。雙方的優?差距，?僅反映在關東軍的因地制宜?求主動之作戰模式上，也反映在東?軍的因循苟且坐以待斃的消極回應模式中。除?雙方在軍事策?上主被動的明顯差?，關東軍的政治動員能??是?容忽視。吉?市可在1個星期，瀋陽可在3個月之內，恢?原貌。這份效?，無疑的可為關東軍對東?地方事務的熟悉及掌握，提供最佳的?明。也由於關東軍對東?事務有十足的掌握，九一八事變的戰事中因而得以在關東軍所設計的軌道上進?。

“First, war; second, talk; and third, reassurance” was the tripartite military tactics taken by the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army took “war” to the Nationalist's Northeast Garrison Force of Liaoning, since its first and foremost goal was to seize the Southern Manchurian Railway. In addition to gaining control over transportation lines and thereby assure the free movement of the armies, the 25 cities along the Southern Manchurian Railway also provided the best target for takeover in Manchuria, since control of the railway lines meant control of the core. The Kwantung Army tackled Jilin Province with “talk”. Xiqia, the representative chairman of Jilin, opened up the door to the Kwantung Army on the third day following the Mukden incident, and leading the whole provincial surrender soon came on the tenth day. Xiqia's attitude from war to peace was the entire elaborate plan during the incident. With a chessman Xi-qia, 7 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, 85 percent of the Nationalist infantry and 100 percent of the cavalry troops, abandoned resistance and willing to accept the adjustment. Hence, it is clear that the Kwantung Army's political strategy was a great success. For Heilongjiang, the Kwantung Army offered reassurance, since this area, commonly called northern Manchuria, remained under the influence of USSR. Japan had no power on this area. However, it used the commissioner Zhang Jinghui, a respected man who had power to influence political and military affairs in Manchuria, to build up its power. As opposed to the Kwantung Army's strategy “First, war; second, talk; and third, reassurance,” the Nationalist's Northeast Garrison responded with “refuse battle, fear battle, and observe battle”. The response of the military operations with positive or passive decided who would win or lose. The Kwantung Army took positive actions according to the local conditions, while the Nationalist Northeastern Garrison remained the same old rut and waited to death. Aside from the two sides' different military strategies, the Kwantung Army's capacity for political mobilization cannot be ignored. Jilin recovered within a week and Mukden within two and a half months. The Kwantung Army's ability to lead the recovery is explained by its intimate knowledge of Manchurian conditions. Given the Kwantung's Army's mastery of Manchurian conditions, the Mukden incident progressed according to its plans.