本文以分配理論為基礎，觀察我國第二、三、四屆立法院期間，三讀通過具有分配政策特質的法案以及記名表決預算項目之制定過程與結果，藉以回答立法院在分配政策型態上，是否因為國會議員之間的互惠原則而呈現「幾乎全體一致」的決策型態？這種「幾乎全體一致」的決策型態是否會因為該項分配政策所分配的利益具有爭議而崩解？如果的確如此，那麼政黨與常設委員會所扮演的角色如何？我們觀察「離島建設條例」制定案。並且我們也分析二、三、四屆立法院期間中央政府總預算當中，具有分配政策性質並同時從事過記名表決的預算案項目（單位預算），系統性地觀察區域立法委員在處理爭議性分配政策預算時，政黨與常設委員會所扮演的角色。同時，我們也分析分配法案記名表決分配預算記名表決當中多數聯盟的特質。 整體來說，在分配法案的制定部分，我們發現「幾乎全體一致同意」的決策型態並不是分配政策制定的常態。法案一旦涉及政黨的意識型態或是政黨直接利益，或是政策利益分配的規模過於龐大並涉及公平的爭議時，則全院「幾乎全體一致同意」的決策型態很難出現，而是呈現另一種我們稱之為「政黨內部幾乎全體一致同意」的決策型態（intra-party universalism）。也就是說各政黨之間立場壁壘分明，但是各政黨之內全體一致同意。而當政黨界線分明時，負責審查的常設委員會委員對於審查會審查條文內容所持立場與其他全院非委員所持立場並無顯著的差異。在爭議的分配性預算方面也是呈現類似的決策型態，23筆記名表決的分配性預算幾乎通通呈現「政黨內部幾乎全體一致同意」的決意型態。有趣的是，隨著不同的分配預算項目，獲勝聯盟內部的政黨組合也呈現不同的現象。有時候國民黨與民進黨合作，有時國民黨與新黨（或親民黨）合作，有時候又是新黨與民進黨合作。同樣是爭議性分配預算的分析，我們發現，即使常設委員會委員在一些預算案當中所持的立場較為一致，但是這種一致性的立場並非取決於他們是否屬於同一個委員會，而是取決於常設委員會委員所屬政黨的立場。同時，這種現象在各政黨之間並無明顯的差異。

　　　　　The present study explores the pattern of distributive policy making during the time period of the 2nd to the 4th Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. Specifically, we ask whether universalism is the regular pattern of distributive policy making in the Legislative Yuan? Does the universalism still hold when the policy benefit being distributed is controversial? If it is not the case, then what roles do party and standing committee play? We analyze distributive bills and twenty-three controversial distributive budget items during the time period of the 2nd to the 4th Legislative Yuan aiming at answer these questions. Besides, the characteristics of winning coalition for each distributive bill and budget are explored as well. Overall, we find that universalism is not the monolithic pattern of distributive policy making. The intra-party-universalism tends to prevail once the partisan interests or ideology getting involved, in the sense that every legislator stands in the partisan line, and almost everyone within their party has the same policy preference. Moreover, the policy preferences of committee members are along with party line so long as the partisan issue comes to play. Finally, when the partisan issue breaks legislators apart, different types of wining coalition are formed. There is no constant combination of parties in the winning coalition. Yet different combination of party coalition is formulated depending on the attributes of policy benefits. In most cases with rare exceptions, Democratic Progressive Party tends to cooperate with New Party fighting Kuomintang for the infrastructure or public works related benefits. Kuomin tang is willing to stay with New party on the veteran's affair or ideology related policy benefit.