非營利組織應建立適當的責任機制來提昇管理效能以及維持公共信任。本文採用公共政策分析的政治經濟研究途徑，根據非營利組織的關係人與性質，建構一個非營利管理的責任架構。在此架構之中，解析非營利管理責任問題的三個層面：監督問題、評估問題與反饋問題，這三項問題的根源即在個體偏好與集體行動之間的矛盾性。欲解決此一矛盾性，本文由委託人－代理人理論、社會選擇理論、集體行動理論等三種學說與非營利管理的特性，提出可行的方式：以提供管理者負面或正面的誘因以及透過心理動機產生工作團隊來解決監督問題；以縮小決策者偏好的範圍以及提昇非營利組織的透明度來解決評估問題；以提供關係人選擇性誘因以及建立多元的協力關係解決來反饋問題。

　　　　　Nonprofit organizations (NPO) should create appropriate accountability systems to enhance management effectiveness and maintain public trust. This article employs public policy analysis and a political economy approach to build a system of accountability for nonprofit organizations, according to the constituencies and characteristics of such an organization. Within this system, this article analyzes three levels of management responsibility in a nonprofit organization and problems associated with each of them: oversight, evaluation, and feedback. The origin of the three problems is a contradiction between individual preference and collective action. In order to resolve the contradiction, this article proposes feasible measures based on the characteristics of nonprofit management and three theories: principal-agent theory, social choice theory, and collective action theory. These measures resolve supervision problems by providing management with negative or positive incentives and by encouraging teamwork through motivation. Evaluation problems are resolved by minimizing the areas of preference of the decision-maker and by increasing the transparency of nonprofit organizations. Feedback problems are resolved by providing constituencies with selective incentives and by building multiple partnerships.