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篇名 張嘉璈與戰後初期中蘇關於「國民政府接收東北」之談判(1945/10~1946/4)
卷期 19
並列篇名 Chang Kia-ngau and the Sino-Soviet Negotiations about the Nationalist Government's Restoration of Manchuria During the Early Postwar Period, October 1945-April 1946
作者 栗國成
頁次 139-180
關鍵字 蔣中正宋子文王世杰張嘉璈東北之接收中蘇東北經濟合作史達林馬林諾夫斯基斯拉特闊夫斯基Chiang Kai-shekT.V. SoongWang Shih-chiehChang Kia-ngauThe takeover of Manchuria from Soviet TroopsThe Sino-Soviet economic cooperation in ManchuriaJoseph V. StalinRodion Y. MalinovskyMikhail I. SladkovskyTSSCI
出刊日期 200312

中文摘要

     二次大戰末期,蘇聯匆促對日宣戰,蘇軍隨即依〈雅爾達協定〉,兵分三路,佔據中國全東北(1945/8~1946/4)。扶植中共勢力進入東北(偶有壓抑),阻撓國民政府軍隊迅速進入該地區;藉以逼使國民政府「親蘇疏美」,及應允合辦東北工礦業,為蘇聯此時主要對華策略。蘇軍撤出東北,則採取能拖則拖戰術。 國民政府參與主持接收東北對蘇談判者,在中央為行政院長宋子文,及外交部長王世杰;在長春則為東北行營之熊式輝、張嘉璈、蔣經國。張嘉璈根據其自身與蘇方接觸經驗,力主國民政府不妨曲從蘇聯不當之要求,儘速與之議定「中蘇東北經濟合作協定」,則蘇聯或能儘速撤軍,並讓國軍迅速進入東北(至少可據有南滿);以免夜長夢多,使中共得志於東北,而將不利於國民政府之大局。蔣經國大體同意張氏主張。在中央之宋子文、王世杰,或者由於親身參與《中蘇友好同盟條約》談判之不良印象,極端反對張氏見解,力主除非蘇軍完全自東北撤出,將不與之議定東北經濟合作協定。蔣中正傾向於宋、王見解。此一決策之制定,或即為其後國民政府失利於東北的原因之一。 就維護國家民族之尊嚴及利益角度觀察,宋、王主張,應為無誤;惟就現實政治之利害關係言,宋、王主張或不免失之理想,只能迫使蘇聯更加支持中共,反不若張氏主張之務實。於此是否也突顯了在那段艱辛的談判歲月中(1945/10~1946/4),張嘉璈氏也算得上是一位別具「卓識」的政府談判代表。

英文摘要

     Chang Kia-ngau was a Chinese banker and a high rank official in the Nationalist Government before the end of World War II. During the latter part of the Sino-Japanese War (1943 to 1945), he had lived in US and served as a government sponsored researcher focusing on the problems of economies and reconstructions of China during the postwar period. In September 1945, he was assigned as the Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Northeast Headquarters of the Nationalist Government, which was one of the positions to negotiate with the Commander of the Soviet Red Army in Manchuria about the restoration of it from Russia to China. Supporting the Army of the Chinese Communist Party to gain controls of parts of Manchuria and expelling the US influence from it were the main strategic targets of the USSR during the early postwar period. Meanwhile, obstructing the entrance of the Nationalist Army into Manchuria deliberately and hoping to sign an agreement with Her about the Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation in Manchuria were two other important strategic targets of the USSR. Facing the above complex and subtle external situation, T.V. Soong and Wang Shih-chieh, the prime minister and the minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist government respectively, set the policies for issues related to Manchuria the China wouldn't negotiate with any economic cooperation in Manchuria with Russia unless the Red Army evacuate completely. These policies consequently led to the failure of the Nationalist Government to regain Manchuria from the Red Army in the spring of 1946. During that period, Chang Kia-ngau was one of few important officials in the Nationalist Government claiming that China should be admitted to have an agreement of the economic cooperation in Manchuria with Russia due to the possibility that the Red Army might subsequently assist the Nationalist Army to advance towards Manchuria smoothly. Therefore, the Nationalist Army could at least have the possibility to occupy southern parts of Manchuria. Although Mr. Chang's opinions were suppressed by his directors, his flexible and pragmatistic stands and the excellent foresight should have been consented.

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