本文透過賽局理論與實證分析來探討教育與所得之間的關係。在理論方面，修正諾貝爾獎得主Spence的傳訊模型，加入政府數量開放政策的考量，探討大學錄取率變動對就學意願與勞動工資的影響。本研究發現當一、低能力者上大學的成本較高；或二、高能力者上大學的成本與低能力者上大學的成本差異較大；或三、大學聯考錄取率較高時，分離均衡比較容易成立。另外，本文利用主計處與教育部的統計資料，除呈現學歷高低與勞動所得之間的正相關外，也發現在各級學歷訊號中，勞動市場上雇主辨識能力高低的相對關鍵點為是否接受教育、是否接受大學教育，以及是否接受研究所教育。當大學錄取率超過52.98%時，台灣的勞動市場上開始出現擁有大學學歷者所得下降的情形。

This paper utilizes game theory and empirical analysis to investigate the relationship between education and the wage of college graduates in the labor market. By introducing the influence of governmental quota policy, we modify the signaling theoretical model submitted by a Nobel Prize laureate Spence. We show that the separating equilibrium is more likely to hold if 1.the studying costs paid by low ability students for entering colleges are high, or 2.the differences of studying costs between high ability students and low ability students are large, or 3.the government imposes college entrance quota policy and the entrance rate are high, are satisfied. In addition, by utilizing the official data from the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, and from the Ministry of Education, the empirical results indicate a positive relationship between education and wage. Educational degrees do influence earning. Among different educational levels of signals, three key levels are identified for employers to identify employees’ capability: whether or not receiving education, whether or not going to college, and whether or not receiving graduate training. In addition, the wage of college graduate students begins to decline when the college entrance rate is higher than 52.98%.