本文採固定/隨機效果模型，探討公司治理變數與公司策略、績效的關係，以研發密集產業為對象，期間為1997到2001年。理論上，治理機制的發揮，將促進股東的利益，抑制經理人的不良企圖;股東偏好創新策略，以極大化其財富；經理人則傾向多角化策略，以極大化自身效用。實證結果顯示，公司治理機制和創新策略、市場績效的關係多與預期相符，和多角化策略、會計績效的關係則異同參半。其他發現如下：(1)策略變數的中介與干擾效果皆只獲部分支持，(2)使用不同的績效指標會得到不同的結果，(3)管理者持股率的非線 性，僅在符號上呈現，未具統計顯著性。

This paper uses fixed/random effects model analysis to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on strategies and performance for R＆D-intensive industries during 1997-2001. Theoretically, corporate governance protects stockholders from managerial opportunism. Stockholders prefer wealth maximizing innovation strategies while managers prefer to maximize their own utility through diversification strategies. Our results show that the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and innovation strategy are almost consistent with our expectation, yet only weakly supported in cases where diversification was adopted. Other findings include the following: (1) The mediating and moderating effects of strategy variables are only slightly significant. (2) Empirical results are varied across performance proxies. (3) Management ownership has an insignificantly nonlinear impact on performance.