列寧式黨國體制的最大特色，在於一個權力無所不色的政黨，結合政府行政部門的專政工具如軍隊、警察、官僚體系和司法機構，對人民實行全面性的專制統治，因此，政府中具有人民屬性的立法部門，自然處於專政與被專政之間的尷尬地位，經常淪為統治階級尋找合法性的工具。是以，人民代表機構的代表屬性獲得保留並且刻意予以強化，西方國家議會的其他功能，經常成為犧牲的對象。
中共黨對人大功能的主要牽制，在於決策與監督兩方面。在黨的領導下，人大如何「決定」國家重大事項?此乃中共「議行合一」制的根本矛盾所在。黨既為社會主義事業的核心，代表無產階級實行專政，怎麼可以受其所代表的人大所監督?假如黨權上頭還有更高權力的話，黨如何遂行領導?
具體困難之一，在於共產黨的「決策權」和人民代表大會的「決定權」不易區分。中國共產黨對國家大政方針享有「決策權」。然而，根據八二憲法的規定，全國人大及其常委會享有對國家重大政策的「決定權」運作上，可能發生抒格。人大尤其是地方人大在行使「決定權」時，是否會被視為走向黨委爭權?

A patry-state regime invariably features an omnipotent vanguard political party monopolizing， in the name of the people， the means of dictatorship including the military， police， and judicial organs. Embarrassingly situated between the subjects of the dictatorship and the dictatorial power structure， the legislature is usually treated as a tool for legitimacy. Thus， while its legislative and supervisory roles are often downplayed， the function of representation is purportedly augmented. This is why a system of proportionate representation is so important in the People's Congress system of China so that people from all walks of life， fang fang mian mian， are selected to reflect the “granddemocracy" set forth by their revolutionary ideals.
In a word， the CCP has refused to relinquish power to the People's Con-
、gresses in two areas: decision-making and supervision. One of the main built- in defects of the representative systems of Leninist regimes has been the contradiction between the authority of the people and that of the party. IfPeople's Congresses ar'e to be the ultimate source of power as is stipulated in the constitution， how then is the party able to exercise leadership without compromising that privilege? At issue then is the controversy cocerning their respective rights of decision-making， the Party'sjie-cher quan and the PC'sjueding quan.