針對中共近年來推行的三項國家級小城鎮試點計畫，本文透過田野調查資料，主現中央計畫的內容，並探討河北與京津地區的建制鎮，如何在落實試點計畫的同時，分別與中央政策發生金融、土地、條塊(官僚組織的垂直與水平結構)關係的衝突。

本文重點放在分析筆者一九九七年十至十一月間，在河北京津地區收集的鎮級田野資料。被三種國家試點計畫涵蓋的河北三鎮，在各自實行小城鎮計畫的同時，都與中央發生利益摩擦:c鎮為支援自辦企業，不惜以其準金 融機構違背國家利率政策，高利吸金;b鎮則因地方政府自建攤位而致富，卻因護商(甚至縱容販賣色情錄影帶)而與中央部委發生條塊的街突.x鎮則以集體土地不變更國有化招商，而把原歸中央的「土地增值稅」儘放入地方政府庫中。

在結論部分，我們以田野資料對照兩種研究中國「地方政治經濟學」的架構一地方企業政權與地方產權體制。本文肯定「地方政治經濟學」的研究途搓，而認為未來相闊的田野調查應集中在三大變項之關係的澄清上:中央模糊規定的農地產權、地方經濟實力者的組合、及農地開發利益的分配。

In order to evaluate three state-endorsed pr吋ects of township reform， this author chose three representative towns 一onefrom each type of project. The results of the study found that in realizing state guidelines， all three towns nevertheless contradicted state policies in terms of bureaucratic jurisdiction， finance， and land transference.

This study is based on my fieldwork with B， C， and X Townships (all located in Hebei Province) from October to November of 1997. In accordance with state regulations， Township B built ten marketplaces with stalls for lease. In order to maximize rent， however， the township does not interfere with stands selling pornography and other illegal items， a negligence that causes it trouble with several ministries in Beijing. In order to finance its own collective enterprises， Township C has created its own bank which pays high interests in order to attract deposits， a practice in contradiction with state regulations. Finally， Township X has used its collective land to invest in a health club. Itdid not bother to follow the law and first “nationalize"the land for commercial use. By avoiding these central government regulations， Township X thus appropriated the share of rents due to its superior governments.

This study concludes that three key variables are important for understanding local political economy: interpretations of the property rights of agrarian land， the portfolio of the economically influential locals， and the distribution of profits resulting from land development.