本文綜合新制度經濟學和國家理論，論證中國大陸在準備根本「不變革」政治規則，僅僅在「實現公有制多樣化」的範圍內，乃至仍然高舉「四個堅持」的框架下，進行實質上不過是「產權修正」的局部補修，將無法徹底達到改造國有企業的目標。一種「以不觸動公有體制為前提」的改革，也不能導致有效率的產權改革。本文試圖證明，「增量一漸進」改革模式實際上是 這種「低效改革」的理論概括。本文通過「國家障礙」一泛宏觀調控論、產權殘缺、僵持性談判、政治軟約束一四個類型，論證了作為國家暴力潛能之一的「合法性潛能」(legitimacypotential) ，正是國有企業改革的最大障礙。

This thesis synthesizes the economic theory of New Institutionalism and State theory to argue that the Mainland China still exerts its political rule of being “unwillingto change." From the limited sphere of “carryingout the diversity within a state-owned system" to its persistent and high-sounding framework of “FourInsistences，\" in fact Mainland China engages in a partial amendment of “estatecorrection，\" a correction that fails to achieve the goal ofa total reform in the state-owned enterprise sector. A reformation with a premise of being unable to alter the state-owned system will lead to an iheffective reform of property rights and will be destined to fail.

This paper also attempts to prove that the reformativ� mode of a “gradualincrease" is the theoretical generalization of this“low-effective reform." Moreover， this thesis will present four types of “StateBarriers" � generalized macro control， absence of property rights， deadlocked negotiations， and political soft constraints - to reason that the “legitimateviolent potential" as one of the state violent potentials turns out to be the greatest obstacle to the reformation of the stated-owned enterprise.