本文的目的在於研究中國高新區域的政治鑲嵌究竟如何形成與如何運作？政治鑲嵌的關係、方式與內容不同，又會如何影響和制約政府和焦點廠商所進行的策略選擇？以長三角的半導體產業作為分析對象，著重於中國政府（中央和地方政府）和長三角重要的晶圓廠的政治鑲嵌之研究。本文實證發現，在中國高新區域的政治鑲嵌是隨著時間性的不同，在內容亦有所不同，但卻無法支持Guthrie（1998）所指稱的「當中國市場經濟愈發達或法令愈完備時，關係（guanxi）的重要性會下降」或如陳東升（2001）的研究，認為台積電在創建初期，政治鑲嵌程度非常高，甚至是由政府所主導，但隨著產業的發展，企業擁有足夠經濟資源和經營能力，足以當握產業方向，鑲嵌程度逐漸降低之情形。換句話說，只可證實政治鑲嵌是動態的，會隨時間而異，但卻不必然會隨著時間而遞減。

This paper provides a theoretical framework to help explain political embeddedness of China's high-tech regions, how it forms and operates. It also illustrates how the relationships and approaches of political embeddedness influence and constrain the strategic choices of focal firms or among firms. The semiconductor industry in Yangtze Delta is discussed as a case. Our empirical findings show the context of political embeddedness differs depending on time variance, which didn't fully support the Guthrie's（1998）claim that the art of guanxi（i.e. guanxi practice）may occupy a diminishing role in China's urban industrial economy as the economic transition progresses. It also diverges from Chen's（2001）findings that the level of political embeddedness was relatively high as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited（TSMC）was even dominated by Taiwanese government in the beginning, but as the firm progresses and becomes more adept in its function, the level of political embeddedness declines gradually. We argue political embeddedness should be a dynamic process, but the significance of political embeddedness does not necessarily decline depending on time variance.