本研究主要目的是探討二技推薦甄選中，因為推甄學校與學生之間的不對稱訊息可能產生的問題。推甄制度中，學生知道學校師資設備與評比，然而學校並不知道學生的真正類型，所以此一推薦甄選過程，為一不對稱訊息賽局。錄取機制之成績評比分為兩階段，第一階段為統一入學測驗成績，佔總成績50％，篩選倍率為兩倍，第二階段為書面審查及面試，佔總成績比例分別為30％與20％。從篩選賽局的觀點，此一制度使得不具訊息優勢的學校，先行設計一種機制，希望學生可以揭露真正類型，使的『學生進入心目中理想學校就讀，學校招到其招生目標的學生』的目的可以達成。據此，本研究建立推甄篩選賽局，結果發現：各校需依據本身重點發展特色，設計出可分離學生才能與潛力的機制，使學生真正型態被揭露，如此達成學生與甄選學校雙贏結果。具體作法如：甄選學校要求學生提供全國性競賽作品或證照獎狀，此外，而甄選學校可以建立畢業門檻，如入學後TOEIC成績需達一定成績以上方能畢業，讓學生在選擇學校時將此條件納入考量，進而自行揭露其類型。

The purpose of this paper is to debate some problem in the system of recommendation because of asymmetric information between students and school.The mechanism of enrolling new students includes two stages. The fist stage is that all students have to attend an exam. Alter ranking the order of the students by their score, the double number of enrolling students will be ask to hand on personal data and to have an oral quiz. From the views of screening game, the schools set some criteria, and then the students send some messages to the school. But it fails when the students cannot send better messages of quality to the school.In the signaling game, we find that the good students have to get some license so that their good ability is certificated. And the bad students cannot imitate the behavior of good students. The other way is that the school can ask students to get a high score in particular examination like TOEIC.