本文的目的在於探討政府規定審計公費下限是否能夠提升會計師的審計品質。審計公費下限是指政府規定會計師的簽證公費不得低於特定水準，此制度曾經在台灣實施多年，卻未受到政府與學者的重視。在亞洲地區，大多數公司是家族企業，甚至由企業主擔任經理人，所以企業主與經理人之間的代理問題並不嚴重。代理問題的核心，可能是在企業主（大股東）與小股東之間的內外矛盾。除了考量這些亞洲地區的經營特性，本研究還納入企業主與會計師之間的策略互動，及會計師之間的價格競爭，分析審計公費與審計品質之關係，及審計公費下限對審計品質之影響。本研究發現，當審計公費與法律責任聯結，而且將審計公費下限設在適當的水準時，規定審計公費下限具有提升會計師審計品質之效果。

This paper aims to study the possibility of improving CPA's audit quality if a floor limit on audit fees is placed by the government. Audit fee floor can be referred as a government-imposed restriction on CPA attestation fee, which must be maintained above a pre-specified level. This mechanism has been implemented in Taiwan for years; however, the government and academics did not pay too much attention on the appropriateness of this restriction. Most companies in Asian countries are family-owned; and as such moral hazard is not considered as a key issue between enterprisers and managers. However, moral hazard problem occurs when there is a conflict in interest between enterprisers (major shareholders) and minor shareholders. In this paper, the relationships between audit fee and audit quality are analyzed. The effects of how audit fee floor impacting upon audit quality is also a part of our analysis. Strategic interactions between enterprisers and CPAs, price competition among the CPAs, and the Asian business traits are all considered in the analysis. Our results shows that CPA's audit quality can be improved if the government sets up an appropriate audit fee floor and legal liabilities are attached to the audit fee.