自從昆因在1990 年將上帝誡命理論稱為神學意志論，「神學意志論」一詞逐漸被倫理學與宗教哲學學者所接受，或者用來取代「上帝誡命理論」一詞，或者用作後者的同義詞。但是，「神學意志論」一詞也在一些哲學辭書中出現，其涵義卻有所不同。本文嘗試釐清「神學意志論」的意義，指出一般哲學辭書中的「神學意志論」通常意指信仰論，與昆因的用法不同。另一方面，在研究中世紀神學和哲學的論著中，「意志論」常被用來指稱與知性論對立的一個神學和哲學傳統。此中世紀的意志論傳統是否就是昆因所指稱的神學意志論傳統，是一個值得研究的課題。筆者嘗試指出，雖然中世紀意志論者確實主張道德義務取決於上帝的意志，昆因、亞當斯等人的當代上帝誡命理論在道德義務理論部分與中世紀意志論相合，在道德價值理論部分卻與知性論相近，因此可以視為中世紀知性論與意志論論點的綜合型態。

Since Philip Quinn employed the term “theological voluntarism” in 1990 to signify divine command theory, it has been adopted in ethics and philosophy of religion as either a synonym of or a replacement for divine command theory. I argue that the term “theological voluntarism” in Quinn’s terminology, standing for any theory which holds that morality depends on the commands or the will of God, has to be distinguished from the same term as it appears in various encyclopedia and dictionaries of philosophy, which signifies the fideistic position that religious beliefs have no need to be justified by means of rational proofs. While Quinn might identify theological voluntarism with the voluntarist tradition in medieval theology and philosophy, I argue that the divine command theories of Quinn and Robert Adams can be considered as an attempt at synthesis of medieval intellectualist and voluntarist doctrines.