篇名 | 第三人論證與柏拉圖之理論型 |
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卷期 | 37 |
並列篇名 | The Third Man Argument and Plato's Theory of Forms |
作者 | 王志輝 |
頁次 | 1-41 |
關鍵字 | 理論型 、 第三人論證 、 分有 、 自我表述 、 非同一性 、 Theory of forms 、 Third man argment 、 Participation 、 Self-predication 、 Non-identity 、 THCI |
出刊日期 | 200903 |
本文的主旨在於,討論如何藉由柏拉圖自身理型論的立場,來避
This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number of interpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false.